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INTRODUCTION
ERNEST CALDWELL AND TERRY NARDIN*
Terms such as "globalization," "internationalization," and "harmo-
nization" in political and legal discourse invite two, sometimes contra-
dictory, approaches within comparative studies: one emphasizing
sameness, the other, difference. The first articulates universals derived
from the dominant legal cultures as a basis for identifying similarities
with "other" legal cultures.1 This quest for "sameness" is further driven
by western-derived political or legal concepts and institutions, which
were exported to, imposed on, or transplanted into, non-western socie-
ties over the past few centuries. The second approach argues that
global connectivity has led to increased contextual variation associated
with a proliferation of hybrid systems. In place of similarity, one finds a
heightened sense of global plurality concerning the very topics, con-
cepts, and institutional frameworks informing contemporary discours-
es on law and politics.z
Instead of retaining static characterizations of certain western-
derived concepts and institutions, scholars are now arguing that com-
parative law and comparative political theory should engage with non-
western modes of thought and practice as potential sources of new
understandings of politics, law, and society. But how does one engage
the "other" so as to learn something about one's own legal culture?
That is the primary question framing the papers of this symposium.
Each paper uses a distinct method to engage East Asian constitutional
experience and considers what can be learned when such methods are
applied.
* Ernest Caldwell is Lecturer in Chinese Law at the School of Oriental and African Studies (School
of Law), University of London. Terry Nardin is Professor of Political Science in the Department of
Political Science at the National University of Singapore.
1. The link between these two phenomena has been noted by James Gordley, The Univer-
salist Heritage, in cOMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 31-45 (Pierre Legrand
& Roderick Munday eds., 2003); Esin Oriici, Comparatists and Extraordinary Places, in
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS, supra, at 467-92.
2. See for example, Vivian Grosswald Curran, Dealing in Difference: Comparative Laws
Potentialfor Broadening Legal Perspectives, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 657, 657-68 (1998); WERNER MENSKI,
COMPARATIVE LAW IN GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ASIA AND AFRICA 3-17 (2006).
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The papers for this symposium issue were originally written for a
workshop titled, East Asian Perspectives on Legal Order, held at the
National University of Singapore in August 2010. The Asia Research
Institute and the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the National
University of Singapore, with support from the Shibusawa Ei'ichi Me-
morial Foundation and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada, jointly organized the workshop. It was the second in
a series of six workshops in a collaborative international project, East
Asian Perspectives on Politics: Advancing Research in Comparative Polit-
ical Theory. This workshop brought together more than thirty distin-
guished scholars of legal and political thought from East and Southeast
Asia, Europe, and North America to explore the potential for non-
western legal theories to advance studies of political and legal theory,
and to interrogate many of the accepted "universals" informing such
studies.
The effort to think more broadly about law in relation to political
order is especially urgent in the case of East Asia, a region historically
considered by Western observers to be without law (as they under-
stood it). Such judgments reinforce Western conceptions of legal order
while obscuring the sources of law in Asian societies. These include
legal codes and case law - whether indigenous, borrowed, or imposed
- as well as legitimizing practices such as those of Shinto in Japan or
extra-judicial rituals in Taiwan. Rich sources of East Asian legal
thought and practice can also be found in domains that modern West-
ern legal theory does not typically consider to be law-related, such as
kinship or religion. The "custom" that was dismissed as part of an anti-
nomian "rule by man" ethos during the imperial periods is today re-
garded as a significant basis of political association. Under communist
rule, too, activities often considered to be religious or ethical but not as
"legal" in the categories of Western legal thought were upheld as
sources of legitimacy and institution building. This symposium argues
by example that political and legal theory should build upon the wider
range of legal experience intimated by these East Asian ideas and prac-
tices.
The path toward understanding these ideas and practices is not
always straight or clearly marked. For example, current East Asian
understandings of law sometimes translate East Asian legal ideas into
invisible Western conceptual schemes, making it hard to distinguish
"native" and "foreign" ideas. How can legal systems be studied com-
paratively without imposing categories that in the past made East
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Asian societies appear "lawless"? Some East Asian states have retained
European legal practices from a colonial past; Hong Kong and Singa-
pore are only the most obvious examples. Others, like Japan in the Mei-
ji era and China in the late imperial and early republican periods,
adopted Western institutions in the absence of colonization. How have
Asian and Western thinkers theorized these syncretic legal orders?
What is the relationship between historical legal practices and their
current forms, and what light does this throw on how law is under-
stood in these societies?
In China and the East Asian societies influenced by their philo-
sophical and moral heritage, East Asian debates on law and legality
were often framed as revealing a tension between "Confucian" ideals of
virtue and moral persuasion and "Legalist" arguments for centralized
state control backed by punishment. This dichotomy figured in the
historical self-understanding of imperial Confucians in China and Japan
and has been invoked to chastise the Maoist leaders of China's Cultural
Revolution. It also poses a more general puzzle about the sources of
legal order that have been repeatedly examined throughout Chinese
history: does this legal order come from the law itself or those who
enforce it? Following Western incursions into East Asia in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, the dichotomy between virtue and
punishment was reframed as one between the "rule of law" and "rule
of man," thereby affirming Western legal categories. Yet, that dichoto-
my fails to give due attention to the extent to which some East Asian
societies have assimilated Western law. For example, Meiji Japan and
China adopted German legal codes. Today, East Asian legal scholars use
Western legal concepts to generate supposedly "East Asian" views of
law that manifest the blending of local and foreign ideas.
By engaging with East Asian legal ideas and practices, the Singa-
pore workshop was designed to challenge and broaden how Western-
educated political and legal theorists think about law. It aimed to sup-
port this critical rethinking by considering a wider range of ideas about
law and its sources, aims, and limits than are commonly in the minds of
such theorists. In doing so, it hoped to render Western political and
legal theorizing a less parochial and more truly global enterprise.
The papers we have selected for the present symposium give par-
ticular attention to methodological issues in the study of Asian consti-
tutionalism. If the purpose of comparing constitutional orders is to
learn something not only about the "other" but also about oneself, how
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does one compare? What are the pitfalls associated with comparing
western and non-western constitutional orders?
The papers by Tom Ginsburg, Ernest Caldwell, and Michael Dow-
dle serve as the primary point of departure for six additional papers,
which take the form of extended commentaries, two for each main
article. This mirrors the highly effective format used during the work-
shop, which was designed to (1) develop a dialogue between scholars
East and West; (2) increase awareness of cultural context when study-
ing specific law-related topics; and (3) provide new categories of
thought and practice not rooted in European or American ideas or
practices.
Those aims also animate this symposium. A specialist in a specific
field of Asian constitutional law writes each of the three main papers.
Two commentators then discuss each paper. One commentator is a
specialist in Asian legal/political thought who discusses the implica-
tions of the paper's thesis for the study of other Asian legal orders. The
other commentator is a specialist in Western legal/political thought
who considers the implications of Asian constitutional thought and
practice for the study of the Western legal tradition and for compara-
tive legal studies in general.
The first set of papers considers the existence of nascent constitu-
tionalism within pre-modern Asian societies and its implications for
contemporary constructions and interpretations of an Asian constitu-
tional heritage. The lead paper, Tom Ginsburg's Constitutionalism: East
Asian Antecedents, employs a "turn-to-history" approach. It sifts
through the pre-modern histories of China, Japan, and Korea seeking
political and legal theories as well as particular institutional features
that suggest functional similarities to modern articulations of constitu-
tionalism. The appeal of such an approach is evident by its application
in several recent studies of non-western constitutional systems. These
studies focus on uncovering conceptual equivalents to, or indigenous
features amenable to, liberal constitutional values, such as rule of law,
check-and-balance mechanisms, and rights protection.
Ginsburg is primarily concerned with what he considers to be a
necessary constitutionalist element, that of "precommitment"-
defined as an "action done . .. to restrain oneself from doing something
that one would otherwise do because such restraint will itself directly
improve one's future welfare"-and he ascribes proto-constitutionalist
values to pre-modern East Asian administrative theories and institu-
tions that constrain and limit actions of the government or the sover-
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eign.3 The value of the method he employs is supported not only by its
use by western scholars, but also by a similar practice carried out by
judges in East Asia. Discussing the Capital City Case, Ginsburg shows
how the South Korean Constitutional Court majority opinion invoked
constitutional authority and historical precedent from Korea's pre-
modern past to invalidate a legislated resolution to move the South
Korean capital from Seoul. For Ginsburg, such an historical approach,
which seeks functional analogs in pre-modern non-western societies to
modern constitutionalist concepts or institutions, has the potential to
sharpen our understanding of the contemporary functioning of legal
transplants in the non-west and better make sense of the multiplicity
of constitutional practices evident in the world today.
This turn-to-history methodology - which poses functional ana-
logues between isolated pre-modern Asian theories and institutions,
on the one hand, and a modern (often Eurocentric) conceptualization
of constitutionalism, on the other - is not without critics, however.4 In
his comment, Rogers Smith expresses strong sympathy to both the
approach and goal of Ginsburg's paper but argues for a more nuanced,
contextual understanding of the indigenous political and legal values
attached to these historical theories and institutions - to which Gins-
burg ascribes merely proto-constitutionalist value. Relatedly, Smith
highlights the interpretive problems that arise from the teleology im-
plied in labeling historical theories and institutions as "proto-" or "nas-
cent" constitutionalism. In line with Smith's concerns, Arun
Thiruvengadam voices a similar skepticism regarding the objectivity of
such a methodology. By examining the sole dissenting opinion in the
South Korean Capital City Case in conjunction with several Indian Su-
preme Court cases which make "historical" or "traditionalist" claims,
Thiruvengadam highlights the inherently fraught and political nature
of history, which bears weighty implications for its interpretation and
application to constitutional debates.
The second set of papers focuses on methods of interpreting con-
temporary constitutional practice in East Asia, particularly China.
Where the methodology advocated in Ginsburg's paper was predicated
upon the pursuit of functional similarities, the lead paper for this sec-
3. Tom Ginsburg, Constitutionalism: East Asian Antecedents, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 11, 14
(2012) (quoting Steven R. Ratner, Precommitment Theory and International Law: Starting a Con-
versation, 81 TEx. L. REV. 2055, 2057 (2003)).
4. For an overview of the functionalist methodology in comparative law, see Michele Grazi-
adei, The Functionalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS, supra
note 1, at 100-27.
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tion, Ernest Caldwell's Horizontal Rights and Chinese Constitutionalism:
Judicialization through Labor Disputes, seeks to highlight the potential
contributions of Chinese constitutional practices that are often per-
ceived to be different from their Western counterparts.s Caldwell ob-
serves that much of the criticism leveled at China's constitutional
development is the result of analytical methods too invested in norma-
tive claims grounded in an American-centric constitutional paradigm.6
Such methods focus on Chinese political issues that impede the institu-
tion of US-style judicial review, which typically construe rights "verti-
cally."7 These methods also fail to compare China's constitutional
developments to those emerging from European constitutionalism
(particularly the constitutional mechanisms of Scandinavian or Conti-
nental nations).
Caldwell examines a series of Chinese court cases involving em-
ployer-employee labor disputes in which lower court judges actively
engaged in constitutional interpretation and openly invoked and en-
forced horizontally oriented socio-economic rights to prosecute those
engaged in exploitative labor practices. Such interpretations are clearly
different from the more commonly studied constitutional practice of
judicial review. However, Caldwell links this practice of horizontal en-
forcement to the developing constitutional doctrine of "indirect effect"
found specifically in Germany and increasingly elsewhere in Europe.8
Caldwell's analysis demonstrates that the study of Chinese constitu-
tionalism need not be confined methodologically to the institutional
paradigms or the rights discourse of American constitutionalism. His
paper further shows that by broadening the comparison of China to
include the constitutional systems of Continental Europe, the pursuit of
difference can open unexplored realms of similarity.
5. Other scholars have noted the need to rely less on assumptions of continuity and argued
that when conducting comparative research one should take the existence of difference seriously.
See e.g., Curran, supra note 2; Pierre Legrand, The Same and the Different, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL
STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS, supra note 1, at 240-311.
6. For similar critiques of the Amerocentric dominance in comparative legal discourse, see
Antoine Garapon, La place paradoxale de la culture juridique Americaine dans la mondialisation, in
EUROPEAN WAYS OF LAW: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 71-92 (2007). For a critique fo-
cused on such dominance as it relates to the study of China, see Michael Dowdle, Of Comparative
Constitutional Monocropping: A Reply to Qianfan Zhang, 8 INT'L J. CONST. L. 977, 977-84 (2010).
7. That is, as individual rights held against the State.
8. There are several studies examining the phenomenon of 'indirect effect,' 'horizontal
effect,' or 'privatization of the constitution.' See e.g., JORG FEDTKE & DAWN OLIVER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE PRIVATE SPHERE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2007); Christoph Beat Graber & Gunther Teubner, Art
and Money: Constitutional Rights in the Private Sphere?, 18 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 61, 61-73
(1998); Mattias Kumm, Who is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles
and the Constitutionalization of Private Law, 7 GERMAN L.J. 341,341-369 (2006).
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Like the methodology employed by Ginsburg, the methodological
concern with difference that Caldwell advocates is also not without
criticism. In his comment, Victor Ramraj acknowledges the value of
destabilizing long-held, dominant interpretive paradigms when con-
ducting comparative analyses, but he challenges Caldwell's continued
reliance on a court-centric approach to the study of constitutionalism.
Ramraj advocates exploring the potential for viable Chinese constitu-
tional discourses and practices outside of the courts and even outside
of the state. In contrast, Arif Jamal's comment attempts to draw Cald-
well's argument supporting China's constitutional difference back into
a normative debate over whether or not China's constitutional prac-
tice, devoid as it is of a judicial review mechanism, can indeed be rep-
resentative of "true constitutionalism." Each of these comments forces
us to reflect on the limitations of scope and of conceptual terminology
when conducting comparative research.
The third set of papers directly engages the question of methodol-
ogy, not just for the study of Asian constitutional thought and practice,
but also for the greater field of comparative constitutional law. In the
lead essay in this section, Michael Dowdle critiques the traditional ap-
proaches to comparative constitutional law - which he views as archi-
tecturally dominated by the liberal tradition - and proposes an
alternative way of approaching comparative constitutional analysis
that he calls "constitutional listening." Constitutional listening derives
from a particular interpretive method developed by Donald Davidson,
the principle of charity. It involves taking seriously the indigenous con-
stitutional discourses of countries other than one's own, particularly
countries whose political systems seem at first blush to be largely in-
compatible with standard (and presumed to be universal) criteria of
constitutional government. By examining the constitutional discourse
surrounding China's Draft Property Law, Dowdle argues that one ad-
vantage of the constitutional listening approach is that it helps us to
better comprehend a fuller range of constitutional possibilities, which
are often precluded by the assumed fixity of Eurocentric concepts of
constitutionalism.
In their commentaries, Roy Tseng and Leigh Jenco strongly agree
with Dowdle on the need to refine existing methodologies used to
study non-western constitutionalism, and they join him in calling for
more nuanced interpretive perspectives capable of balancing the view
of the global with a contextualized vision emanating out of the local.
But, each suggests some limitations in Dowdle's own method of consti-
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tutional listening. Tseng believes that Dowdle paints a rather essential-
ist picture of liberalism and its dominance in constitutional discourse,
arguing that it is in fact a multivalent tradition containing differing
understandings of comparison, purpose, and practice. Tseng argues
that if Dowdle is to contrast his constitutional listening approach with
the liberal approach, a more refined understanding of the latter is nec-
essary. Tseng also raises concerns over the ethical value of employing a
morally neutral comparative methodology, such as constitutional lis-
tening. For Tseng, such moral judgments should be part of any cross-
cultural examination.
For her part, Leigh Jenco argues that Dowdle's "constitutional lis-
tening" is itself embedded in Western assumptions - particularly an
Enlightenment-informed concept of reason - that might obstruct its
ability to achieve the goals it sets for itself. Furthermore, Jenco argues,
similarity and difference should not be understood as a priori givens
but as constructs created by the very act of comparison. She suggests
that by incorporating this mode of self-reflexivity and by increasing
receptivity to conceptual de-centering, Dowdle's method of constitu-
tional listening could be instrumental in transforming the very termi-
nology and conceptualization of constitutionalism.
Taken together, these papers suggest both the need to expand our
understanding of constitutionalism and the difficulties of doing so. Not
only are constitutional regimes less well insulated from one another
than in the past but, the emergence of transnational and even global
legal orders puts additional pressure on those regimes to respond to
external influences. Moreover, constitutional thinking in all societies
today is influenced not only by what is going on in other societies but
by the transformation of the global legal order from one regulated by
public and private international law into a complex hybrid of interna-
tional, transnational, and supranational legal regimes. In understand-
ing this emerging global order we would be wise to bear in mind that
the constitutional ideas contributing to it are unlikely to be those of the
west alone.
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